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Humanitarian Law and Direct Participation in Hostilities
by Private Contractors or Civilian Employees
Michael N. Schmitt*
Over the past decade, many military affairs analysts have touted the advent
of a "revolution in military affairs." 1 Although generally framed in the context of
those technological advances that make possible four-dimensional, network-
centric warfare, it is the dramatic "civilianization" of conflict that may prove
2normatively more revolutionary.
In no conflict has the civilian footprint supporting military operations been
larger than in Iraq.' This paper begins by examining civilian employee and
private contractor involvement in Operation Iraqi Freedom ("OIF") as a case
study in the contemporary nature of such participation. It then assesses the
possibility of either de jure or de facto integration of civilians into the armed
forces. Concluding that integration will be rare, the article turns to the issue of
when it is that civilians can be classified as "directly participating in hostilities,"
thereby becoming both lawful targets of attack and prosecutable for their
Professor of International Law and Director, Program in Advanced Security Studies, George C.
Marshall European Center for Security Studies, Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany. The views
expressed herein are those of the author in his personal capacity and should not be construed as
the official position of either the Federal Republic of Germany or the United States.
1 For a comprehensive compilation of material on the "revolution in military affairs," see The
RMA Debate website created by the Project on Defense Alternatives, available online at
<http://www.comw.org/rma/> (visited Nov 18, 2004).
2 The four dimensions are air and space, land, sea, and cyberspace. Network-centric warfare must
be distinguished from "platform-centric" warfare, in which military assets, like ships, operate as
separate entities (albeit sometimes cooperatively). In network-centric warfare, various platforms
are linked such that they share the same battlefield "picture" and operate as parts of an
integrated whole. It is the development and networking of information, sensor, command and
control, and engagement grids that has enabled this transformation in warfare.
3 David Phinney, Dangerous Business: Sending Contractors to War Zone Poses New Problems for DoD, Fed
Times (Feb 24, 2003), available online at <http://federaltimes.com/index.php?S=232833>
(visited Dec 6, 2004).
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actions. Finally, it concludes with an analysis of various scenarios involving
civilian participation.
I. CIVILIANS AND THE WAR IN IRAQ
Estimates of the number of government civilian employees and contractor
personnel present in Iraq range from twenty to thirty thousand, making civilian
workers the second largest contingent in-country.4 These figures do not include
the thousands of nonmilitary personnel who support OIF from outside the
country.
The scope of conflict-related activities which civilians perform today is
unprecedented. Of greatest importance is their centrality to the complex logistics
system that supports the Coalition armies. For instance, civilian contract
employees drive the nearly seven hundred trucks that deliver supplies daily to
the sixty military bases across Iraq.' They also provide most of the combat
service support (for example, feeding troops and maintaining billeting facilities).
Closer to the fight, civilians maintain complex weapons systems such as the
F-117 Nighthawk fighter, B-2 Spirit bomber, M1 Abrams tank, and TOW
missile system, and operate the Global Hawk and Predator unmanned aerial
vehicles ("UAV"). Civilians also conduct intelligence collection (especially with
remote sensors) and analysis, although often from outside the area of operations.
Contractors and government civilians have even interrogated prisoners of war
and other detainees, regrettably participating in the now-infamous abuse
incidents.6 By September 2004, investigators had recommended referral of six
4~ Estimates on the number of contractors vary widely as there is no central registry documenting
their presence. However, most estimates are in this range. See, for example, Edward Cody,
Contractor Immunito a Divisive Issue, Wash Post Al (June 14, 2004); Roseanne Gerin, No
Withdrawal'- Contractors vow to stay course in Iraq, 19 Wash Tech (May 10, 2004), available online
at <http://www.washingtontechnology.com/news/19_3/cover-stories/23484-1.html> (visited
Nov 19, 2004). They far outnumber the United Kingdom's 8,361 troops (as of October 21,
2004). GlobalSecurity.org, Non-US Forces in Iraq - eary December 2004, available online at
<http://www.globalsecurity.org/miitary/ops/iraq-orbat-coalition.htm> (visited Nov 19,
2004).
5 James Glanz, For Truckers in Iraq, It's All about Money, 'Intl Herald Trib I (Sept 28, 2004).
6 See the formal investigations of detainee abuse: US Army, Antonio M. Taguba, Investigating
Officer, Article 15-6 Investigation of the 800th Military Police Brigade, available online at
<http://www.npr.org/iraq/2004/prisonabuse-report.pdf> (visited Nov 19, 2004); US Army,
Anthony R. Jones, Investigating Officer, AR 15-6 Investgation of the Abu Ghraib Prison and 205th
Military Intelligence Brigade, US Army, George R. Fay, Investigating Officer, AR 15-6 Investigation of
the Abu Ghraib Detention Facihy and 205th Military Intelligence Brigade, available online at
<http://news.findlaw.com/nytimes/docs/dod/fay82504rpt.pdf> (visited Nov 19, 2004).
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cases of alleged contractor abuse to the US Department of Justice for possible
prosecution.
Private security companies ("PSCs") have even been protecting employees
and facilities of the US government, other governments, and private companies.'
PSCs (over fifty operate in Iraq) range in size from a few individuals to
hundreds. Global Risks, for example, employs 1100 personnel, including 500
Gurkha and 500 Fijian troops, thereby making it one of the larger "military"
contingents in Iraq.9 Contractors provided personal security for Coalition
Provisional Authority ("CPA") Administrator L. Paul Bremer, as they currently
do for senior civilians and distinguished visitors. They also guard nonmilitary
facilities at the Baghdad airport and inside the Green Zone, protect convoys, and
shoulder the lion's share of training for the New Iraqi Army, paramilitary forces,
and law enforcement organizations.'o
Fay, AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Fadlity at 131 (cited in note 6). The alleged
participation in torture of detainees has generated a class action suit in a US District Court
against the companies involved, principally Titan Corporation and CACI International, for their
role in the alleged torture, rape, and summary execution of detainees. See Saleh v Titan Corp, No
04 CV 1143 R (NLS) (SD Cal), 2d amended complaint at 2, available online at
<http: / /www.ccr-ny.org/v2/legal/docs/Saleh / 20v%/ 20Titan%/2OCorp/ 20
Second%20Amended%20Complaint.pdf> (visited Nov 19, 2004). An attempt to ban the
practice of using private contractors in military interrogations was tabled in the US Senate. See
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, S 2400, Amend No 3313, 108th
Cong, 2d Sess (June 14, 2004), in 150 Cong Rec S 6831 Oune 16, 2004).
8 See Letter from Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, to The Honorable Ike Skelton
(May 4, 2004), available online at <http://www.house.gov/skelton/5-4-
04_Rumsfeldletter on contractors.pdf> (visited Nov 19, 2004). The Coalition Provisional
Authority defines PSCs as "non-Iraqi legal entities or individuals not normally resident in Iraq,
including their non-Iraqi employees and Subcontractors not normally resident in Iraq, that
provide security services to Foreign Liaison Missions and their Personnel, Diplomatic and
Consular missions and their personnel, the MNF and its Personnel, International Consultants
and other Contractors." Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 17 (Revised), Status of
the Coalition ProvisionalAuthoiy, MNF - Iraq, Certain Missions and Personnel in Iraq, CPA/ORD/27
June 2004/17 § 1.14, available online at <http://www.cpa-iraq.org/regulations/
20040627_CPAORD_17_Status of Coalition.Rev withAnnexA.pdf> (visited Dec 6,
2004). On the topic generally, see P.W. Singer, War, Profits, and the Vacuum of Law: PrivatiZed
Military Firms and International Law, 42 Colum J Transnat L 521 (2004).
9 P.W. Singer, Warriors for Hire in Iraq (Apr 15, 2004), available online at
<http://archive.salon.com/news/feature/200 4 /O 4 /15/warriors/print.html> (visited Nov 2,
2004).
10 And contractors are often used at home to free up military personnel for combat overseas.
Currently, 4,300 private security contractor employees guard some fifty US Army installations in
the United States pursuant to contracts worth well in excess of $1 billion. T. Christian Miller,
Army Turns to Private Guards; The Military Is CritciZedfor Risking Security at Bases and for a Process that
Awarded $1 Billion in Contracts without Competiive Bidding, LA Times Al (Aug 12, 2004).
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Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld has asserted that PSCs in Iraq "provide
only defensive services,"" but some of their activities appear indistinguishable
from military operations. 12 Consider an incident in April 2003 during which
employees of Blackwater USA engaged in an intense battle with insurgents who
were attacking the CPA headquarters in Najaf. Thousands of rounds of
ammunition and hundreds of 40mm grenades were expended in the firefight,
and the company used its own helicopters to resupply employees during the
battle.
13
And contractors, particularly those in the security sector, do not come
cheap. 4 By July 2004, Kellogg, Brown & Root (Halliburton) alone had been
awarded $11.4 billion in contracts for Iraq and Afghanistan. 5 In light of the
number of contractors and contract values, critics have taken to calling the
Pentagon-contractor relationship a coalition "of the billing."' 6
"1 See Rumsfeld letter (cited in note 8). A CPA order and memorandum limited contractors and
other nonmilitary security personnel to possession of 'Small Arms and Defensive Weapons...
including pistols, shotguns, and rifles firing ammunition up to an [sic] including 7.62mm and
Defensive Weapons including crew-served machine guns, non-lethal weapons and riot control
agents." CPA Memorandum Number 5, Implementation of Weapons Control Order No. 3
(CPA/ORD/23 May 2003/03) § 1, CPA/MEM/22 August 2003/05, available online at
<http://www.cpa-iraq.org/regulations/20030822_CPAMEMO_5_Implementation-
of_WeaponsControl withAnnex A.pdf> (visited Dec 6, 2004); CPA Order Number 3
(Revised) (Amended), Weapons Control, CPA/ORD/31 Dec 2003/03, available online at
<http://www.cpa-iraq.org/regulations/20031231 CPAORD3_REVAMD_.pdf> (visited
Dec 6, 2004).
12 An attempt to "prohibit contractors from participating in most combat operations except in
cases of self-defense, and ... prevent U.S. moneys from being used to pay contractors for those
purposes" was tabled in the Senate. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2005, S 2400, Amend No 3313, 108th Cong, 2d Sess (June 14, 2004), in 150 Cong Rec S 6706
(June 14, 2004); Amend No 3313, 150 Cong Rec S at 6831 (cited in note 7).
13 Dana Priest, Private Guards RepelAttack on U.S. Headquarters, Wash Post Al (Apr 6, 2004).
14 Aegis Defense Services, for example, is charging $430 million to guard Iraqi oil installations
over three years. Jeremy Lovell, Private Affair, Melb Herald Sun 84 (Sept 25, 2004). Private
military companies are earning an estimated $100 billion a year in government contracts. Jim
Krane, A Private Army Grows Around the U.S. Mission in Iraq and Around the World, Cnews (Oct 29,
2003) available online at <http://cnews.canoe.ca/CNEWS/World/Iraq/2003/10/29/240886-
ap.html> (visited Dec 6, 2004).
15 The Center for Public Integrity, Post-War Contractors Ranked by Total Contract Value in Iraq and
Afghanistan from 2002 through July 1, 2004, available online at <http://www.publicintegrity.org/
wow/resources.aspx?act= total> (visited Nov 20, 2004). For a regularly updated listing of
contracts regarding Iraq and Afghanistan, see The Center For Public Integrity, Contractors: All,
available online at <http://www.publicintegrity.org/wow/bio.aspx?act=pro> (visited Nov 20,2004).
16 Tom Engelhardt, Eveything's Private: Private Contractors in Iraq Might Be the Largest U.S. Coalition
Partner (Nov 4, 2003), available online at <http://www.motherjones.com/
news/dailymojo/2003/1 1 /we-60102a.html> (visited Nov 20, 2004).
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The financial rewards for individual civilians serving in Iraq can be
substantial. Senior PSC personnel regularly earn in the $20,000 a month range,
sometimes more." Blue-collar workers pull in approximately $80,000 to
$100,000 annually. 8 The pay is so good relative to military salaries that the US
Special Forces are experiencing a "brain drain" as well-trained troops depart for
more lucrative positions with civilian contractors. 9
But, at the same time, the risks can be deadly. Recall the dramatic April
2004 incident in Fallujah, during which crowds dragged the bodies of four
Blackwater employees through the streets in scenes reminiscent of Mogadishu
circa 1993. 20 And by September 2004, Kellogg, Brown & Root had suffered
forty-six employee deaths.2' Overall, contractors have experienced more
casualties than any Coalition contingent except the US: more than 100 by
August 2004.22 Sadly, by September 2004, in excess of 140 foreign hostages have
also been seized, the vast majority civilians; 26 were later murdered.
There are practical problems with the use of contractors or civilian
government employees in an area of combat operations. For instance, PSC
activities are limited by the terms of their respective contracts, thereby limiting
the flexibility of military commanders overseeing them when responding to
evolving situations. Indeed, contractors may simply refuse to perform
contractual functions, preferring contract penalties or termination to the
assumption of risks incident to compliance. The decision of numerous
companies to withdraw from Iraq in the face of the deteriorating security
situation, especially in the wake of hostage takings, is illustrative.
Further, PSC employees may lack adequate training or be of questionable
background. Backwater, as an illustration, has admitted that 30 percent of its
employees do not have military training. Additionally, it hired thirty Chilean
soldiers in February 2003, most reportedly with ties to the Pinochet regime.23
Not surprisingly, professional military personnel have expressed concern about
17 Neil King Jr. and Yochi J. Dreazen, Amid Chaos in Iraq, Tiny Securiy Firm Found Opportunity, Wall
StJ A1 (Aug 13, 2004).
18 Russell Gold, The Temps of War. Blue-Collar Workers Ship Out for Iraq, Wall StJ Al (Feb 5, 2004).
19 Pauline Jelinek, Many Elite Soldiers Leave for Better Pay, Christian Broadcasting Network (July 21,
2004), available online at <http://www.cbn.com/cbnnews/wire/040721h.asp> (visited Nov 2,
2004).
20 Mike Farhi, Progress is Ongoing in Iraq, White House Says, Wash Post A20 (Apr 1, 2004).
21 Glanz, For Truckers in Iraq (cited in note 5).
22 Renae Merle, Contract Workers Are War's Forgotten: Iraq Deaths Create Subculture of Loss, Wash Post
Al (July 31, 2004).
23 Singer, Wamors for Hire in Iraq (cited in note 9).
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armed civilians operating in close proximity to combat operations.24 Many worry
that misconduct by civilian contractors may cause reprisals against uniformed
forces. They also question the rules of engagement under which civilians
operate.25 Most fundamentally, the presence of armed civilian groups operating
independently, even if only "defensively," violates the unity of command
principle of war.26
Problematically, civilians are far less accountable than their military
counterparts. Consider US mechanisms for handling misconduct. Government
civilian employees are subject to civil service disciplinary measures, but the
system is administrative, not judicial. Contractors are even less accountable, for
the contracting officer, and not the military commander, exercises "supervisory"
control over them. In the event of misconduct, the contracting officer may
impose pecuniary penalties on the firm, but has no authority vis-A-vis the
employee. Rather, discipline is the company's responsibility. 2 This absence of
genuine command and control over contract personnel invites abuses. Tellingly,
some US judge advocates have reportedly charged that contractors were used
during interrogations of detainees in Iraq to keep aggressive techniques quiet.28
Of course, when civilians commit crimes, penal sanctions should be
imposed. However, status of forces and related agreements often determine
whether the country in which a civilian commits a crime has jurisdiction.29 In
Iraq, civilian government employees and government contractor personnel
enjoyed immunity from prosecution during the occupation. As occupation
ended, Ambassador Bremer issued CPA Order 17, which grants continued
immunity from Iraqi jurisdiction to civilians of the Multinational Force and
"international consultants" provided to the Iraqi Transitional Government by
other states: contractor personnel enjoy immunity "with respect to acts
24 This comment is based on numerous conversations I have had with military officers deployed
to Iraq.
25 Borzou Daragahi, In Iraq, Private Firms Ligbten Load on U.S. Troops: For Profit, Private Firms Train
Iraqi Soldiers, Provide Security and Much More, Pitt Post-Gazette (Sept 28, 2003), available online at
<http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/03271/ 2 2 636 8 .stm> (visited Nov 20, 2004).
26 "Unity of command means that all forces operate under a single commander with the requisite
authority to direct all forces employed in pursuit of a common purpose." Joint Chiefs of Staff,
Joint Publication 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations A-2 (Sept 10, 2001), available online at
<http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new-pubs/jp3_O.pdf> (visited Nov 20, 2004). The other
principles of war are objective, offensive, mass, economy of force, maneuver, security, surprise,
and simplicity. Id at Appendix A.
27 Rumsfeld letter (cited in note 8).
28 This assertion has been denied by a Pentagon spokesperson. Joshua Chaffin, Contract Interrogators
Hired to Avoid Supervision, Lon Fin Times 9 (May 21, 2004).
29 See generally Dieter Fleck, ed, The Handbook ofthe Law of Visiting Forces (Oxford 2001).
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performed by them pursuant to the terms and conditions of a Contract or any
sub-contract thereto," although the "Sending State" may waive said immunity.30
To fill the jurisdictional vacuum, some States have established domestic
criminal jurisdiction over their civilians on the battlefield. US legislation, for
instance, includes the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act, which subjects
individuals employed by the US military abroad, whether directly or as
contractors, to federal jurisdiction.3'
What accounts for the explosion of contractor personnel and civilian
government employees on or near the battlefield? Cost is one factor. In the
aftermath of the Cold War, most governments sought to realize the "peace
dividend" by drawing down legacy armies sized and equipped to fight a global
conflict.3 2 But the dividend never materialized; on the contrary, many states
found their security environment complicated by the demise of (stabilizing)
bipolarity and the emergence of new threats like transnational terrorism and
internal unrest. Yet, for domestic political reasons, downsizing was a process
that usually proved irreversible.
In light of this dilemma, the use of civilians in support roles proved
especially appealing because it freed up military personnel to perform combat
missions. In this way, armed forces avoided a straight-line relationship between
reduced numbers and reduced combat effectiveness. In the US, the consequent
civilianization was labeled "Transformation."
33
Civilians are also typically less costly than their military counterparts.
Although salaries may exceed those of uniformed personnel, overhead pales by
30 CPA Ord No 17 at §§ 4.3, 5.2 (cited in note 8). Pursuant to Article 26(C) of the Law of
Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period (hereinafter Transitional
Administrative Law), "[the laws, regulations, orders, and directives issued by the Coalition
Provisional Authority ... shall remain in force until rescinded or amended by legislation duly
enacted and having the force of law." Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the
Transitional Period, art 26(C) (Mar 8, 2004), available online at <http://www.cpa-
iraq.org/government/TAL.html> (visited Nov 20, 2004). The UN Security Council endorsed
the transitional arrangements as set forth in the Transitional Administrative Law. Security
Council Res No 1546, UN Doc S/RES/1546 (2004).
31 Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act, 10 USC § 3261 (2000). This Statute was primarily
designed to address crimes by contractors against US military personnel and their dependents
abroad. Also providing possible jurisdiction is the War Crimes Act of 1996, 18 USC § 2441
(2004), and the federal torture statute, 18 USC § 2340A (2000).
32 In the United States, the size of the military dropped to its present 1.4 million from 2 million a
decade ago. Robert Burns, Downsizng of Military Now Unlikejy, Seattle Post-Intelligencer (Sept 1,
2001), available online at <http://seatlepi.nwsource.com/national/37341_military0l.shtml>
(visited Nov 23, 2004).
33 On transformation, see material compiled by the Department of Defense on its Transformation
website, available online at <http://www.defenselink.mil/transformation/> (visited Nov 20,
2004).
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comparison. Civilians, especially contractors, perform discrete tasks rather than
operate within a system in which they are expected to acquire the skills and
experience necessary to advance through the ranks. Therefore, they can devote a
much greater percentage of their time to the core undertaking, without having to
also complete training and education or provide the same to others. Further, the
military does not have to fund frequent transfers to acquire the experiential base
necessary for assumption of greater responsibility, nor compensate for efficiency
loss while new personnel learn their jobs. Perhaps most significant is the fact
that civilians do not require the extensive support structure that many militaries
provide their uniformed personnel (for example, commissaries, housing, dining
halls, recreational and fitness facilities, hospitals, off-duty education, etc.).
An additional motivator is that the technology of modern warfare often
exceeds the ability of militaries to train their personnel. This phenomenon has
two facets. First, while some technology is so complex that only highly trained
individuals can operate it, most military personnel lack the aptitude or length of
service to develop the requisite skills. Second, some hi-tech military equipment
exists in small numbers in the inventory. Thus, the training thereon is
extraordinarily expensive because it benefits from no economies of scale. Both
dynamics have led to "package deals" in which the military purchases not only
the weapon system, but also contracts for training and maintenance support,
and, in some cases, even operation of the system.34
In Iraq, the dynamic impelling the widespread use of civilians is simple.
With US forces deployed to the Balkans, Afghanistan, and elsewhere, the
number of troops available for combat, occupation, and transition duties in Iraq
has been limited. At the same time, the security situation in Iraq has stretched
combat troops to the breaking point.35 It should, therefore, come as little
surprise that duties usually shouldered by uniformed troops, such as guarding
convoys or airports, have been outsourced. Furthermore, in light of the unstable
security situation, reconstruction projects have created additional security
burdens that cannot be met by military forces.
34 For instance, civilian contract personnel flew aboard the E-8 J-Stars (Joint Surveillance Target
Attack Radar System) during operations over the Balkans from 1995-99 and have manned
ground stations for Predator unmanned aerial vehicle operations (although USAF personnel
have now assumed full responsibility).
35 Ambassador L. Paul Bremer has opined that the size of the US occupation force was too small.
Robin Wright and Thomas E. Hicks, Bremer Criticizes Troop Levels: Ex -Overseer of Iraq Says U.S.
Effort Was Hampered Early On, Wash Post Al (Oct 5, 2004).
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II. LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF CIVILIAN PARTICIPATION IN
CONFLICT
It is not the purpose here to exhaustively explore the legal consequences of
civilian government employee or private contractor participation in hostilities.
Rather, the intent is to consider when they attach. However, a brief review of
consequences will place the subsequent discussion in context.36
Most significantly, pursuant to Article 51.3 of the 1977 Protocol Additional
I to the Geneva Conventions ("Protocol I"), civilians enjoy immunity from
attack during international armed conflict "unless and for such time as they take
a direct part in hostilities.' '37 Those who do directly participate may be legally
targeted and their injury or death does not bear on such conduct of hostility
issues as proportionality or precautions in attack.38 Civilian direct participants are
labeled either "unlawful combatants" or "unprivileged belligerents. 39
Secondly, those who participate in hostilities without the status of lawful
combatant do not benefit from prisoners of war protections, particularly those
of the Third Geneva Convention.4' While combatants may forfeit their right to
36 See J~an-Frangois Qudguiner, Working Paper, Direct Pariipation in Hostiliies Under International
Humanitarian Law (Nov 2003), available online at <http://www.ihlresearch.org/ihl/pdfs/
briefing3297.pdf> (visited Nov 20, 2004).
37 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, art 51.3, 16 ILM 1391 (1977) (emphasis
added).
38 The principle of proportionality prohibits attacks "which may be expected to cause incidental
loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof,
which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated"
from the operation. Id, art 51.5(b). See also id, art 57.2. Even if an attack is proportional, those
who plan, decide on, or execute an attack must take precautions to further spare the civilian
population. For example, "[w]hen a choice is possible between several military objectives for
obtaining a similar military advantage, the objective to be selected shall be that the attack on
which may be expected to cause the least danger to civilian lives and to civilian objects." Id, art
57.3.
39 "Unlawful combatant" is the better term because: (1) it preserves the distinction between
combatants and civilians; and (2) the term "belligerents" generally refers to states which are
party to a conflict, not individuals. On the topic generally, see Knut D6rmann, The Legal
Situation of 'tUnlawful/Unprivileged Combatants", 85 Ind Rev Red Cross 45 (2003); Jason Callen,
Unlawful Combatants and the Geneva Conventions, 44 Va J Intl L 1025 (2004); K.W. Watkin, Working
Paper, Combatants, Unprivileged Belligerents and Conflicts in the 21st Century (June 2003), available
online at <http://www.ihlresearch.org/ihl/pdfs/Session2.pdf> (visited Nov 4, 2004).
40 Geneva Convention (IlI) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (1949), art 4, 6 UST
3316 (1956) (hereinafter Geneva Convention I1).
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be a prisoner of war (for example, by failure to wear a uniform),4' civilians who
participate directly in hostilities generally lack that right in the first place.42
Finally, civilians who directly participate may be punished for their actions
because they lack the "combatant privilege" to use force against lawful targets.
Currently contentious is the issue of whether mere direct participation, without
more, is a war crime.
Consider the case of David Hicks, the Australian detainee being tried
before a Guantanamo Military Commission for, inter alia, "attempted murder"
(of "American, British, Canadian, Australian, Afghan, and other Coalition
forces") "by an unprivileged belligerent."43 This charge is somewhat curious. In
humanitarian law, combatants enjoy no general protection from attack,44 so
attacking them cannot be a war crime (absent more).
Perhaps, then, prosecution is based on Hick's alleged status as an
unprivileged belligerent. Despite dated support for the assertion that being an
unprivileged belligerent can constitute a war crime,45 the better position is that
41 Protocol I, art 44.4 (cited in note 37).
42 An exception exists for certain persons who accompany the armed forces without being
members thereof, certain crews of aircraft and vessels, and members of a levee en masse. The first
two categories are discussed in Section I11. A levee en masse occurs when "[i]nhabitants of a non-
occupied territory, who on the approach of the enemy spontaneously take up arms to resist the
invading forces, without having had time to form themselves into regular armed units, provided
they carry arms openly and respect the laws and customs of war." Geneva Convention III, art
4A(6) (cited in note 40).
43 Military Commission Charges, United States v Hicks (June 2004), available online at
<http://news.findlaw.com/wp/docs/gitmo/ushicks604chrg.html> (visited Dec 6, 2004).
Although the accused is not a civilian employee or contractor, the case is instructive.
44 No treaty (including the statutes governing international courts such as the International
Criminal Court, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, and International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda) suggests that targeting a combatant is unlawful. Rather,
combatants are only protected from attack when they are hors de combat because they have
surrendered, are sick or wounded and not carrying on the fight, are shipwrecked, or have
parachuted from a disabled aircraft. Convention between the United States and Other Powers
Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, art 23(c), 36 Stat 2277 (1907) (hereinafter
HIVR); Protocol I, art 41 (cited in note 37); Geneva Convention (1) for the Amelioration of the
Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (1949), art 12, 6 UST 3114
(1956) (hereinafter Geneva Convention 1); Geneva Convention (11) for the Amelioration of the
Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea (1949), art
12, 6 UST 3217 (1956) (hereinafter Geneva Convention Ii); Protocol I, arts 10, 42. They are
also immune from attack when serving as parlementaires conducting negotiations with the enemy
or as medical or religious personnel. HIVR, art 32; Geneva Convention I, arts 24, 25; Protocol
I, art 15. Note that medical or religious personnel are not considered combatants. Protocol I, art
43.
45 In the Hostages Trial, a post-World War II war crimes trial, a military tribunal held that "[w]e
think the rule is established that a civilian who aids, abets or participates in the fighting is liable
to punishment as a war criminal. Fighting is legitimate only for the combatant personnel of a
Vol. 5 No. 2
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only the acts underlying direct participation are punishable. If they amount to
war crimes (for example, killing civilians), the acts may be tried as such. Further,
because civilians who directly participate lack combatant immunity, they may be
convicted for offenses against the domestic law of a State that enjoys both
subject matter and personal jurisdiction. This is the position proffered by leading
scholars,46 as well as that in operational guidance such as the US Army's
Operational Law Handbook (2004).47
In noninternational armed conflict, civilians who participate in armed
conflict also forfeit certain protections. Common Article 3 to the four 1949
Geneva Conventions applies only to "[p]ersons taking no active part in the
country." The United Nations War Crimes Commission, 15 Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals
112 (HMSO 1949). Many embracing this position also cite the US Supreme Court's decision in
ExparteQuirin, 317 US 1 (1942). There the Court held that:
those who during time of war pass surreptitiously from enemy territory into
our own, discarding their uniforms upon entry, for the commission of hostile
acts involving destruction of life or property, have the status of unlawful
combatants punishable as such by military commission. This precept of the
law of war has been so recognized in practice both here and abroad, and has
so generally been accepted as valid by authorities on international law that we
think it must be regarded as a rule or principle of the law of war.
Quirin, 317 US at 35-36 (footnotes omitted). The reasoning in both decisions is flawed,
particularly to the extent that they apply analogies to spying, which is clearly not a violation of
the law of war. See, for example, In re Fleseche, 16 Ann Dig 266, 267 (Spec Ct Cass 1949)
(Holland) (stating that espionage "is a recognized means of warfare and therefore is neither an
international delinquency on the part of the State employing the spy nor a war crime proper on
the part of the individual concerned"). Commentators are in accord, as are the military manuals
such as those of the US Army and UK Forces. See Yoram Dinstein, The Conduct of Hostiliies
under the Law of InternationalArmed Conflict 210-13 (Cambridge 2004); Richard R. Baxter, So-Called
'Unpritileged Belligerency': Spies, Guerrillas, and Saboteurs, 27 Milit L Rev 487 (1975); Department of
the Army Field Manual 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare 1 77 (1956) ("resort to [espionage]
involves no offense against international law."); UK Ministry of Defence, The Manual of the Law
of Armed Conflict 4.9.7 (2004) ("Spies are usually tried by civilian courts under the domestic
legislation of the territory in which they are captured."). The Quirin decision has been criticized
for its deviation from law of war principles by several top scholars and practitioners in the field.
For instance, W. Hays Parks has noted that ".Quirin is lacking with respect to some of its law of
war scholarship." W. Hays Parks, Spedal Forces' Wear of Non-Standard Uniforms, 4 Chi J Intl L 493,
510 n 31 (2003).
46 Dinstein, Conduct of Hostilities at 234 (cited in note 45); Baxter, 27 Milit L Rev at 487 (cited in
note 45); Julius Stone, Legal Controls of International Conflict 567 (Rinehart 1954). See also Derek
Jinks, The Declining Significance of POW Status, 45 Harv Intl L J 367, 436-39 (Summer 2004)
(taking an even more permissive view of the issue).
"Unprivileged belligerents may include spies, saboteurs, or civilians who are participating in the
hostilities or who otherwise engage in unauthorized attacks or other combatant acts.
Unprivileged belligerents are not entitled to prisoner of war status, and may be prosecuted
under the domestic law of the captor." US Army, Judge Advocate General's Legal Center and
School, Operational Law Handbook (2004) 17 (US Army 2004).
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hostilities, ' ' 48 thereby depriving those who do of the limited protections therein.
Although Protocol Additional II to the Geneva Conventions ("Protocol II")
augments the Common Article protections, Article 13.3 thereof deprives
civilians of both the "general protection against the dangers arising from military
operations" and immunity from attack "for such time as they take a direct part
in hostilities."49
The participation of civilian employees and private contractors in
noninternational armed conflict poses only marginally distinct legal issues from
participation in international armed conflict. In the first place, rebel forces are
unlikely to hire civilians or contractors. Further, because rebel forces lack
combatant immunity, violence they direct at their government opponents is
wrongful per se regardless of the status of the victim. This being so, the central
issue is whether the government civilian employee or government contractor
harmed by the rebel was "taking no active part in the hostilities."5 ° If so, the
rebel will have committed a war crime; if not, only a domestic crime will have
been committed. But one assesses participation using the same analysis as in
international armed conflict. Therefore, the focus here shall be on that genre of
conflict.
III. THE LEGAL STATUS OF CIVILIANS INVOLVED IN ARMED
CONFLICT
There are but two categories of individuals in an armed conflict,
combatants and civilians. Combatants include members of a belligerent's armed
forces and others who are directly participating in a conflict. As noted, the latter
are labeled unlawful combatants or unprivileged belligerents; they are either
civilians who have joined the conflict or members of a purported military
organization who do not meet the requirements for lawful combatant status.
Everyone else is a civilian, and as such enjoys immunity from attack.
48 See, for example, Geneva Convention I, art 3(1) (cited in note 44); Geneva Convention II, art
3(1) (cited in note 44); Geneva Convention III, art 3(1) (cited in note 40).
49 Protocol (1) Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, arts 13.1, 13.3, 16 ILM 1442
(1977) (hereinafter Protocol II). Although the Geneva Conventions employ the term "active"
rather than "direct," the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda appropriately found the
terms so similar that they should be treated synonymously. Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions, Geneva Convention I, art 3(1) (cited in note 44); Geneva Convention II, art 3(1)
(cited in note 44); Geneva Convention III, art 3(1) (cited in note 40); Prosecutor v Akayesu, Case
No ICTR-96-4-T, 629 (ICTR 1998).
50 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, arts 8.2(c), 8.2(e)(i), 37 ILM 999 (1998)
(hereinafter Rome Statute).
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A. CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES AND PRIVATE CONTRACTORS AS
LAWFUL COMBATANTS
If civilian employees and private contractors qualify as lawful combatants,
the aforementioned legal consequences never befall them.5 Thus, before turning
to the notion of direct participation, it is necessary to query how civilians might
acquire lawful combatant status. This is one of several issues the International
Committee of the Red Cross has focused on during its ongoing direct
participation project." It is a red herring.53
Combatant and civilian status are opposite sides of the same coin. Article
50.1 of Protocol I provides that "[a] civilian is any person who does not belong
to one of the categories of persons referred to in Article 4 (A) (1), (2), (3), and
(6) of the Third Convention and in Article 43 of this Protocol.' ' 54 The relevant
provisions of Article 4 exclude the following from civilian status:
(1) Members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict, as well as
members of militias or volunteer corps forming part of such armed forces.
(2) Members of other militias and members of other volunteer corps,
including those of organized resistance movements, belonging to a Party to
the conflict and operating in or outside their own territory, even if this
territory is occupied, provided that such militias or volunteer corps,
including such organized resistance movements, fulfil the following
conditions:
(a) that of being commanded by a person responsible for his
subordinates;
(b) that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance;
(c) that of carrying arms openly;
51 Article 43.2 of Protocol I defines participation with reference to direct participation: "Members
of the armed forces of a Party to a conflict (other than medical personnel and chaplains covered
by Article 33 of the Third Convention) are combatants, that is to say, they have the right to
participate directly in hostilities." Protocol I, art 43.2 (cited in note 37).
52 The ongoing multiyear project being conducted in collaboration with the Asset Institute began
in 2003.
53 US doctrine expressly rules out the possibility: "In all instances, contractor employees cannot
lawfully perform military functions and should not be working in scenarios that involve military
combat operations where they might be conceived as combatants." Joint Chiefs of Staff, 4-0
Doctrine for Logistics Support of Joint Operations § V-l(d) (Apr 6, 2000), available online at
<http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/newpubs/jp4_O.pdf> (visited Nov 20, 2004). See also US
Army Field Manual 3-100.21, Contractors on the Battlefield ch 1 (an 2003), available online at
<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/3-100-21 /index.html>
(visited Nov 20, 2004); US Army Regulation 715-9, Contractors Accompanying the Force § 2-3(a)
(Oct 29, 1999), available online at <http://www.army.mil/usapa/epubs/pdf/r7l5_9.pdf>
(visited Nov 20, 2004).
54 Protocol I, art 50.1 (cited in note 37).
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(d) that of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and
customs of war.55
Article 43 provides that:
[t]he armed forces of a Party to a conflict consist of all organized armed
forces, groups and units which are under a command responsible to that
Party for the conduct of its subordinates, even if that Party is represented by
a government or an authority not recognized by an adverse Party. Such
armed forces shall be subject to an internal disciplinary system which, inter
alia, shall enforce compliance with the rules of international law applicable
in armed conflict.5 6
It also notes that a "paramilitary or armed law enforcement agency" may
be incorporated into the armed forces; the party doing so is required to notify
the opposing side of such incorporation. 57
Subparagraph (1) of Article 4 addresses de jure combatant status-in other
words, formal incorporation into the armed forces by a state-whereas (2)
involves combatant status that derives from the nature and actions of a group.
Article 43 encompasses both categories.
It is difficult to imagine a situation in which individual government civilian
or contractor employees might qualify as formal members of the armed forces,
regardless of the duties they perform. In the first place, most armed forces have
set procedures for enlistment or conscription. An individual failing to comply
with them cannot individually become a member thereof. Admittedly, some
militaries have de minimis procedural prerequisites, sometimes even permitting
an individual to acquire "membership" by simply joining the fighting."
However, the very fact that a civilian is separately employed in a government
"civilian" post or works for a company with a contractual relationship to the
government would by definition rule this possibility out. Moreover, if a state
wished to formally draw individual civilians into the armed forces, it could
readily do so. For instance, some countries require certain civilian employees in
key positions to serve as reservists; this facilitates their rapid change of status in
the event of armed conflict. Thus, vis-A.-vis individual civilians, the fact that no
formal recruitment has occurred is dispositive evidence of a state's
understanding that the civilian in question does not enjoy Article 4(A)(1) status.
55 Geneva Convention III, art 4(A) (cited in note 40). This listing appears in Article 13 of both
Geneva Convention I and Geneva Convention II. Geneva Convention I, art 13 (cited in note
44); Geneva Convention 1I, art 13 (cited in note 44). Article 4(A)(6) of Geneva Convention III
also deals with the levee en masse and is irrelevant to this inquiry.
56 Protocol I, art 43.1 (cited in note 37).
57 Id, art 43.3.
58 For example, there were no formal procedures or prerequisites for joining the Taliban armed
forces in Afghanistan.
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Might the group to which such civilians belong qualify as part of the armed
forces? After all, many perform functions indistinguishable from those
performed by military units, sometimes even units in the same armed force that
employs or contracts them.
Again, logic would dictate otherwise. First, such groups coexist alongside,
not within, the armed forces and are thereby distinguishable on that fact alone. It
would be incongruent to suggest that a group with a clearly distinct civilian
identity (conditions of employment, supervisory chain, disciplinary system, etc.)
could somehow transmogrify into an element of the armed services merely
because of the function it performs.
More significantly, recall the Article 43.3 proviso on incorporation of
paramilitary and law enforcement forces, which confirms the requirement for
states to affirmatively act to incorporate groups into the military before they
acquire the status of armed forces. This makes it patent that unincorporated
paramilitary and law enforcement agencies are civilian in nature for the purposes
of humanitarian law. Thus, any of their members who engage in hostile action
against enemy forces prior to notification of incorporation are directly
participating as civilians. For instance, paramilitary forces of the Central
Intelligence Agency cannot be characterized as members of the armed forces
absent incorporation and notification. To the extent that this is so for formal
organized standing paramilitary and law enforcement entities of the government,
it is even more so for other groups of government employees, private military
companies, or other entities acting to maintain law and order or provide security.
Nor does Article 4(A)(1)'s "militias or volunteer corps forming part of
such armed forces" verbiage offer an alternative route to membership. The
official Commentary to the Third Geneva Convention notes the comment
referred to groups that "although part of the armed forces, were quite distinct from
the army as such." 9 This unambiguously suggests a requirement for formal
affiliation with the armed forces beyond a mere term contract.
A further practical obstacle to de jure armed forces status is the
requirement that the group in question meet four criteria. Specifically, the
conditions set forth for militia forces in Article 4(A)(2), which mirror those
contained in the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions,60 also apply to components
of the armed forces. Although this is a somewhat controversial position, and
while textually it would appear they do not, the better position is that the
59 Jean de Preux, Commentag: III Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War 52
(JCRC 1960) (emphasis added) (hereinafter GCIII Commentary).
60 Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land (1899), art 1, reprinted in 1
AmJ Intl L 129, 132 (Supp 1907); HIVR (cited in note 44).
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conditions are implicit in the meaning of armed forces.6 Simple logic supports
this interpretation. For instance, the requirements to wear a uniform and carry
arms openly serve to distinguish combatants from civilians, thereby enhancing
protection for the latter. Suggesting that military personnel need not comply
with them would fly in the face of this rationale.
Article 44.3 of Protocol I further confirms the approach's validity when it
(albeit relaxing the standards of combatancy in ways objectionable to some
states62) provides that to retain combatant status, a soldier must minimally carry
arms openly during a military engagement and during such time as he is visible
to the enemy in the deployment phase of an attack.63 The ICRC Commentary
specifically opines that an individual who does not comply loses combatant
status. In language paralleling the normative consequences of direct participation
by civilians, it explains: "Thus criminal prosecution becomes possible, even for
hostile acts which would not be punishable in other circumstances. In other
words, such a prisoner can be made subject to the provisions of the ordinary
penal code of the Party to the conflict which has captured him. ' ' 64
Since civilian employees and private contractors do not wear uniforms
denoting combatant status, seldom fall under the formal command of military
personnel, and generally lie beyond the reach of military discipline that the
armed forces use to enforce adherence to the "laws and customs of war," it
would be a stretch to style them members of the armed forces.
In sum, it is highly unlikely that civilian government employees or private
contractors, whether individually or as a group, would ever qualify for
combatant status under Article 4(A)(1), particularly in light of Article 43.1 of
Protocol I. To do so, they would have to individually enlist (or be conscripted)
61 As has been noted, "[i]t is generally assumed that these conditions were deemed, by the 1874
Brussels Conference and the 1899 and 1907 Hague Peace Conferences, to be inherent in the
regular armed forces of States. Accordingly, it was considered to be unnecessary and redundant
to spell them out in the Conventions." Michael Bothe, Karl Josef Partsch, and Waldemar A.
Solf, New Rules for Victims of Armed Conflicts: Commentary on the Two 1977 Protocols Additional to the
Geneva Conventions of 1949, 234 (Martinus Nijhoff 1982).
62 The US position on Protocol I provisions is authoritatively set out in Office of the Secretary of
Defense, Memorandum for Mr. John H. McNeill, Assistant General Counsel (International),
1977 Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions: Customary International Law Implications (May 8,
1986) (on file with author). See also Michael J. Matheson, Remarks at the 1987 Humanitarian Law
Conference on the United States Position on the Relation of Customa7 International Law to the 1977
Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions (Jan 22, 1987), 2 Am U J Intl L & Poly 419
(1987).
63 Protocol I, art 44.3 (cited in note 37).
64 Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski, and Bruno Zimmermann, eds, Commentary on the Additional
Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 1719 (ICRC 1987) (hereinafter
Protocols Commentary). It does caveat this assertion with mention that "this is the view of the
majority of the delegations."
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or be formally incorporated as a group. Additionally, the requirements inferred
from Article 4(A)(2) would usually act as a further bar to characterization as
members of the armed forces, and thereby combatants.
But might civilian employees and private contractors be integrated de facto
into the armed forces in the sense of Article 4(A)(2) and Article 43.1?65 Article
4(A)(2) resulted from efforts at the 1949 Diplomatic Conference to address the
partisan operations of the Second World War.66 The four conditions included
therein reflected a delicate balance between the concerns of occupying powers
and the desires of occupied countries.6"
In assessing the Article 4(A)(2) conditions, it must be borne in mind that
they apply to groups, not individuals. Moreover, such groups cannot consist of
government employees, except in the unusual circumstance that they become
resistance fighters upon isolation from the government. Simple logic dictates
that if paramilitary and law enforcement agencies must be formally incorporated,
other groups of government employees cannot circumvent this requirement by
complying with the less stringent requirements of 4(A)(2). The 4(A)(2) inquiry is
thus limited to private contractors.
Before moving to the four express criteria, it is useful to examine the
nature of the groups that might be affected. As noted in the official
Commentary, the threshold question is whether a group is "fighting on behalf of
a 'Party to the conflict."'6 8 Although pre-twentieth century practice was that the
sovereign had to formally authorize fighting units outside the armed forces, by
the time of the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conferences, this traditional requirement
had faded away. Instead, there needed merely to be a de facto relationship
between the group and a party to the conflict, one that makes it apparent for
whom the group is fighting. That the relationship did not have to be formal is
evident from the fact that such a criterion would have excluded some of the very
65 As noted, Article 43.1 relaxes the Geneva conditions by dispensing with the requirement to
distinguish oneself from the civilian population in situations where doing so is not possible, so
long as the individual carries arms openly while deploying to an engagement and during the
battle. This relaxation, which is opposed most notably by the United States, cannot be said to
reflect customary international law. See Office of the Secretary of Defense, Memorandum (cited
in note 62); Matheson, 2 Am U J Intl L & Poly at 419 (cited in note 62).
66 The existing 1899 and 1907 Hague Regulations only embraced "militia and volunteer corps."
Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs on Land, art 1, annex to Convention with
Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land (1899), art 1, 32 Stat 1803 (1903);
Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, annex to Hague Convention
(IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land (1907), art 1, 36 Stat 2277, 1 Bevans
631, 639 (1968).
67 de Preux, GCIII Commentagy at 53 (cited in note 59).
68 Id at 57. See also Dinstein, The Conduct of Hostiies at 39 n 55 (cited in note 45), citing Prosecutor v
Kassem, 42 ILR 470 (Milit Ct 1969) (Israel).
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World War II partisan groups which motivated inclusion of Article 4(A)(2) in
the Geneva Conventions. The requirement is simply that the group be fighting
in support of, in concert with, or in a complementary fashion to the government
forces (or the aims thereof if those forces have been vanquished).
To the extent a group is employed directly by, or under contract to, a party
to the conflict, this requirement should pose no obstacle to 4(A)(2) combatant
status. More tenuous is the situation where a government contractor
subcontracts the firm in question, a prevalent practice in Iraq today. For
instance, the prime contractor may be under contract to rebuild infrastructure,
but then subcontract security for its operations to a PSC. Alternatively, the
prime contractor may have been awarded a broad contract that includes security
of various government facilities in the contractual specifications. Yet, so long as
the activities the subcontractor engages in are integral to contract performance,
they further the objectives of a party to the conflict.
But consider the case of a PSC contracted by other than a party to the
conflict, for instance a private mining or drilling firm operating in the conflict
zone. Maintaining security for such firms may necessitate engaging in combat
operations with forces of one or more of the Parties, but such operations would
not be on behalf of the other side. In other words, the determinative question is
not whom you are fighting, but rather are you fighting in order that one side
might prevail.69 Contractors hired by a private entity to support one side in order
to bolster the chances of the other might qualify; those hired for any other
purpose would not. Obviously, the former is a fairly far-fetched scenario, one
made even more implausible by limits on mercenaries. 7°
A second threshold requirement is independence from the armed forces.
In crafting Article 4, the drafters adhered to the distinction contained in Article 1
of the 1907 Hague Regulations between "militia and volunteer corps forming
part of the army and those which are independent"-hence, Article 4(A)(1) and
4(A)(2).
69 This begs the question of the group which is fighting for its own purposes in order to defeat
one side, in the hope, for instance, that it will come to power upon expulsion of an occupying
force, an interesting scenario which lies beyond the scope of this article.
70 The contract firms in Iraq would not qualify for mercenary status. By Article 47.2(a) of Protocol
I, mercenaries are "specially recruited . . . to fight in an armed conflict," that is, direct
participation is their express purpose. Protocol I, art 47.2(a) (cited in note 37). They must also
be motivated by private gain and promised compensation in excess of that received by the
armed forces, be neither a national of a party to the conflict nor a resident of territory a party
controls, not be a member of the armed forces of a party, and not been sent by a nonparty as a
member of its own armed forces. Id, art 47.2(c)-(). See also International Convention against
the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries, art 1, General Assembly Res No
44/34, UN Doc A/44/49/306 (1989).
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Independence is measured by the extent to which a group operates
autonomously, for if it does not to some degree, it would be indistinguishable
from Article 4(A)(1) militia and volunteer corps (in other words, it would form
part of the military). Many contractors and subcontractors would run afoul of
this provision in that they provide services specified by the armed forces; thus,
they are not meaningfully independent. Of course, the degree of independence
grows as one moves from contractor to subcontractor to firms without
affiliation to a party to the conflict. The catch-22 is that the greater their
independence in operational matters, the less likely contractors are to be acting
on behalf of a party."' But in the improbable event that a contractor operated
with the requisite independence and on behalf of a party to the conflict, it would
need to meet the four explicit criteria set forth in Article 4(A)(2).
Subordination to a commander, the first criterion, excludes individuals
acting alone or in small, unstructured groups. Consider Iraq. Some Coalition
contractors, particularly the large PSCs, might meet this criterion, for they are
generally subject to some form of supervisory direction analogous to
command. 2 It is not necessary that military personnel exercise command. 3
Rather, the question is the extent of accountability and authority wielded by the
person in control. As noted in the official Commentary:
[the leader] is responsible for action taken on his orders as well as for action
which he was unable to prevent. His competence must be considered in the
same way as that of a military commander. Respect for this rule is moreover
in itself a guarantee of the discipline which must prevail in volunteer corps
and should therefore provide reasonable assurance that the other conditions
referred to below will be observed.74
As Yoram Dinstein has noted, "[l]awful combatants must act within a
hierarchic framework, embedded in discipline, and subject to supervision by
71 Lest the discussion appear more significant than it is, this analysis only pertains to groups that
would be characterized as directly participating in hostilities (see discussion below). If the
contractor is not directly participating, and most do not, it is by definition not the sort of group
envisaged by Article 4A(2).
72 "Command" is defined as:
[t]he authority that a commander in the Armed Forces lawfully exercises over
subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment. Command includes the authority
and responsibility for effectively using available resources and for planning the
employment of, organizing, directing, coordinating, and controlling military
forces for the accomplishment of assigned missions. It also includes
responsibility for health, welfare, morale, and discipline of assigned personnel.
Department of Defense, DOD Dictionag of Militay and Associated Terms, available online at
<http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/> (visited Nov 20, 2004).
73 de Preux, GCIII Commentay at 59 (cited in note 59).
74 Id.
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upper echelons of what is being done by subordinate units in the field."75
Arguably, some contractors could meet this standard. Most are organized and
controlled along military lines, an unsurprising fact given that so many of their
employees are ex-military. Whether their employees are sufficiently subject to a
leader's discipline would be a case-specific determination. Of particular
relevance is the degree to which they are subject to criminal prosecution for
abuses of which superiors become aware. State practice demonstrates that a
leader need not play a formal role in this process, for, in many militaries, soldiers
who commit crimes are referred for prosecution to civilian judicial authorities.
That said, to enforce "command" discipline, the leader should have this option
available.
The second and third criteria require distinction from the civilian
population. Although many contractors do carry arms openly, contractors
generally do not wear distinctive attire that distinguishes them from civilians
such as aid and relief workers.76 On the contrary, as noted by a senior US Marine
Corps officer with combat experience in Iraq, "many private US Armies that
work there wear a bewildering and amusing hodgepodge of 'tough guy' attire.
' 7
75 Dinstein, The Conduct of Hosiliies at 39 (cited in note 45).
76 Note that in Iraq the relaxed standards of Protocol I, Article 43, do not apply, as neither the
United States nor Iraq are party states. US Department of the Army regulations allow deployed
government civilians to be issued BDUs (battle dress uniforms), NBC (nuclear, biological,
chemical) equipment, Kevlar helmets, and load-bearing personal equipment "as necessary to
perform assigned duties during hostilities." The uniforms have special insignia intended to
identify the wearer as a civilian. Department of the Army, Pamphlet 690-47: DA Civilian Employee
Deployment Guide (Nov 1, 1995), available online at <http://www.hq.usace.army.mil/
cere/civiliandeploymentguide.htm> (visited Nov 20, 2004). In the Air Force, that insignia is an
olive green triangular patch with the letters "US" in the center on their left shoulder.
Department of the Air Force, AFI36-801: Uniforms For Civilian Employees § 6.7 (Apr 29, 1994),
available online at <http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/pubfiles/af/36/afi36-801/afi36-801.pdf>
(visited Nov 20, 2004).
77 Along these lines, a Marine lieutenant in Iraq provided the following vignette:
While we were waiting for the delegation of IZs (Iraqis) to arrive, the
Ambassador and the generals went into a small room to chat . . . .I was
hanging out outside .... The place was crawling with the Ambassador's and
generals' PSDs (personal security detail). The generals' . . . .are made up of
Marines, but the Ambassador's is made up of private contractors. They all
look exactly alike. Merrill low-top trail shoe-boots, REI or J. Peterman light
weight safari pants, a muted single color t-shirt, highspeed chest rig/flack vest
with lots of magazines, a couple little gadgets, an American flag Velcro patch,
a Glock pistol, an M-4 with some ridiculous scope almost as big as the rifle, a
battered baseball cap, the mandatory goatee, and the clear, spiraled fiber-optic
cord running out of their ear. So they're all walking around, looking concerned
at everyone, talking into their wrists, and oozing with seriousness. One of the
guys starts shooting the shit with me. Nice guy from upstate New York. After
a few minutes, he says, "So, who are those guys over there?" and points at a
small group of PSD guys across the courtyard. I said, "I thought they were
with you." He said.., they weren't. I said, "well who are you with?" He said
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Adherence to the laws and customs of war comprises the fourth criterion.
Iraq represents an interesting case study in this regard. Recall that the 4(A)(2)
assessment is of the group, not the individual. There is no question that some
Coalition contractor employees have egregiously violated the laws of war,
particularly vis-A-vis detainee treatment. However, on the whole, firms have not
engaged in systematic violations that would suggest a disregard for the law. In
order to forfeit combatant status on this count, the company as a unit would
have to engage in violations of humanitarian law. 8
Taken together, the aforementioned criteria make it highly unlikely that
private contractors could qualify for Article 4(A)(2) combatant status. This is
unsurprising, for the provision was never meant to address them. On the
contrary, it was specifically crafted to build on the Hague Regulations' reference
to "militia and volunteer corps" through addition of resistance movements. The
very independence of such groups distinguishes them from the regular armed
forces; private contractors, by contrast, are typically dependent on the armed
forces, if only for fiscal survival.
B. CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES AND PRIVATE CONTRACTORS AS
UNLAWFUL COMBATANTS
If civilian employees and private contractors seldom, if ever, qualify for
lawful combatant status, what are the limits on their participation in hostilities?
In other words, when will their participation rise to the level of "direct"
participation such that they not only are lawfully targetable, but also punishable
for their participation? 9
Unfortunately, the meaning of direct participation, whether in international
or noninternational armed conflict, is highly ambiguous. Articles 4(A)(4) and (5)
of the Third Geneva Convention constitute the only authoritative delineation of
activities barred from characterization as direct participation. Recall that Article
50.1 of Protocol I defines civilians by excluding those encompassed in
subparagraphs 1-3 and 6 of Article 4(A)(2). Thus, individuals falling within the
he was with the Ambassador. I said, "Well who do you work for?" He said,
"Blackwater." I said, "Well, I think those guys work for Triple Canopy ....
Who could they be here with?" He said he didn't know. I didn't either. So here
we are in Iraq, in a courtyard full of mercenaries, but no one can figure out
exactly who is working for who. And they all look so alike, there's no way to
tell. Typical.
Correspondence in possession of author.
78 Note that the requirement involves violations of humanitarian law, not the higher standard of
war crimes.
79 Assuming the actions had been privileged if conducted by a lawful combatant.
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remaining two subparagraphs are by definition civilians, albeit ones entitled to
POW status upon capture. They include:
(4) Persons who accompany the armed forces without actually being
members thereof, such as civilian members of military aircraft crews, war
correspondents, supply contractors, members of labour units or of services
responsible for the welfare of the armed forces, provided that they have
received authorization from the armed forces which they accompany, who
shall provide them for that purpose with an identity card similar to the
annexed model.80
(5) Members of crews, including masters, pilots and apprentices, of the
merchant marine and the crews of civil aircraft of the Parties to the conflict,
who do not benefit by more favourable treatment under any other
provisions of international law. 81
The "such as" language in Article 4(A)(4) demonstrates that the list is
merely illustrative. Unfortunately, the official Commentary does not expound
more fully on the matter beyond indicating "the text could therefore cover other
categories of persons or services who might be called upon, in similar
conditions, to follow the armed forces during any future conflict."8 2 But note
that none of the individuals cited are involved in any direct way with the
application of force. Nor do the provisions distinguish between government
employees and contractors. The sole relationship criterion is that they
"accompany" the armed forces.
In acknowledging the ambiguity inherent in the notion of direct
participation, the International Committee of the Red Cross has noted:
Undoubtedly there is room here for some margin of judgment: to restrict
this concept to combat and to active military operations would be too
narrow, while extending it to the entire war effort would be too broad, as in
modern warfare the whole population participates in the war effort to some
extent, albeit indirectly.
83
Thus, there is a participation continuum that runs from general support for
the war effort to the conduct of combat operations. W. Hays Parks has
80 Geneva Convention III, art 4(A)(4) (cited in note 40). This provision is based on Article 81 of
the 1929 Geneva Convention that in turn derived from Article 13 of the 1907 Hague
Regulations. Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (1929), art 81, 118
LNTS 343, 389-90 (1931-32); HIVR (cited in note 44).
81 Geneva Convention III, art 4(A)(5) (cited in note 40). The mention of more favorable
treatment under international law is a reference to Article 6 of the Eleventh Hague Convention,
which prohibited merchant seamen from being made prisoners of war. Very few countries are
party to that treaty. Convention Relative to Certain Restrictions with Regard to the Exercise of
the Right of Capture in Naval War (1907), 1 Bevans 711 (1968).
82 de Preux, GCIII Commentary at 64 (cited in note 59).
83 Sandoz, Swinarski, and Zimmerman, eds, Protocols Commentary at 1679 (footnotes omitted)
(cited in note 64).
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profitably dissected this continuum into war effort (which is protected under
both customary law and Protocol I), military effort such as military research by
civilians (which he suggests is not protected under customary law, but is
protected by the Protocol), and military operations (unprotected under either
customary or treaty law). Conceived in this manner, Parks suggests that Protocol
I sets a fairly high threshold for direct participation.84
The Commentary appears to support the premise of a high threshold:
"[d]irect participation in hostilities implies a direct causal relationship between the
activity engaged in and the harm done to the enemy at the time and theplace where the
activit takes place." 85 It also describes direct participation as "acts which by their
nature and purpose are intended to cause actual harm to the personnel and
equipment of the armed forces"86 and defines hostilities as "acts of war which
are intended by their nature or their purpose to hit spedfical y the personnel and
the materiel of the armed forces of the adverse Party., 87 In much the same vein,
the Commentary to Protocol II notes that in noninternational armed conflict the
notion of direct participation in hostilities "implies that there is a sufficient
causal relationship between the act of participation and its immediate
consequences."88
Direct participation, therefore, seemingly requires "but for" causation (in
other words, the consequences would not have occurred but for the act), causal
proximity (albeit not direct causation) to the foreseeable consequences of the
act, and a mens rea of intent. In other words, the civilian must have engaged in
an action that he or she knew would harm (or otherwise disadvantage) the
enemy in a relatively direct and immediate way. The participation must have
been part of the process by which a particular use of force was rendered
possible, either through preparation or execution. It is not necessary that the
individual foresaw the eventual result of the operation, but only that he or she
knew his or her participation was indispensable to a discrete hostile act or series
of related acts.89
84 W. Hays Parks, Air Law and the Law of War, 32 AF L Rev 1, 133 (1990).
85 Sandoz, Swinarski, and Zimmerman, eds, Protocols Commentay at 1679 (emphasis added) (cited
in note 64).
86 Id at 1942 (emphasis added).
87 Id at 1679 (emphasis added).
88 Id at 4787.
89 Some have labeled this approach the "kill chain"; in other words, if a particular activity is
necessary to accomplish the "kill" in a specific situation, the activity is direct participation. The
kill chain notion is overly restrictive in that it limits activities to those related to the application
of deadly force; not all military operations seek to weaken the enemy in this fashion. However,
most kill chain activities would unquestionably qualify as direct participation; as such, the
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In the end, direct participation determinations are necessarily contextual,
typically requiring a case-by-case analysis. But case-by-case determinations need
not be eschewed. On the contrary, sometimes they more precisely balance
military requirements and humanitarian ends than mechanical applications of set
formulae. Moreover, armed forces have embraced them. The US Navy's
Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operalions, for example, states that
"[c]ombatants in the field must make an honest determination as to whether a
particular civilian is or is not subject to deliberate attack based on the person's
behavior, location and attire, and other information at the time." 90 Similarly, in
the Tadic case, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
adopted a contextual framework:
It is unnecessary to define exactly the line dividing those taking an active
part in hostilities and those who are not so involved. It is sufficient to
examine the relevant facts of each victim and to ascertain whether, in each
individual's circumstances, that person was actively involved in hostilities at
the relevant time.
91
Perhaps the best tack when analyzing a particular act is assessing the
criticality of the act to the direct application of violence against the enemy.
Consider intelligence. Rendering strategic-level geopolitical estimates is certainly
central to the war effort, but will have little bearing on specific combat missions.
By contrast, tactical intelligence designed to locate and identify fleeting targets is
the sine qua non of time-sensitive targeting; it is an integral component of the
application of force against particular targets. Civilians providing strategic
analysis would not be directly participating in hostilities, whereas those involved
in the creation, analysis, and dissemination of tactical intelligence to the
"shooter" generally would.
Many activities lie between the extremes. In such cases, the methodology
that best approximates the underlying intent of the direct participation notion is
to interpret the term liberally, in other words, in favor of finding direct
participation. That distinction is a seminal principle in humanitarian law.92 An
interpretation of direct participation that allows civilians to retain their immunity
notion of a kill chain is a useful analytical construct when making direct participation
assessments.
90 Oceans Law and Policy Department, Annotated Supplement to the Commander's Handbook on the Law
of Naval Operations § 11.3 (1997).
91 Prosecutor v Tadic, Case No IT-94-1-T, 1 616 (ICTY 1997), available online at
<http://www.un.org/icty/tadic/trialc2/judgement/index.htm> (visited Nov 20, 2004). The
issue was crimes against persons taking no direct part in hostilities.
92 International Court of Justice, Advisory Opinion, Legaity of the Threat or Use of Nulear Weapons
78, 1996 ICJ 257 (uly 8, 1996) ("The first [cardinal principle of humanitarian law] is aimed at
the protection of the civilian population.., and establishes the distinction between combatants
and non-combatants.").
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even though inextricably involved in the conduct of ongoing hostilities will
engender disrespect for the law on the part of combatants endangered by their
activities. Moreover, the liberal approach provides an incentive for civilians to
remain as distant from the conflict as possible because they can thereby avoid
being directly targeted and are less susceptible to being charged criminally for
their acts of participation. While broadly interpreting the activities that subject
civilians to attack might seem counterintuitive from a humanitarian perspective,
it actually enhances the protection of the civilian population as a whole by
encouraging distance from hostile operations.93
The temporal aspects of direct participation also lack precision. Recall that
Article 51.3 immunizes civilians from attack "unless and for such time as they
take a direct part in hostilities."94 The Commentary on the provision notes that
several delegations expressed their view that direct participation includes
"preparations for combat and the return from combat, ' 95 but it further provides
that "[o]nce he ceases to participate, the civilian regains his right to the
protection., 96 With regard to noninternational armed conflict, Article 13.3 of
Protocol II repeats the "unless and for such time" verbiage, while the
Commentary thereon states that protection is denied "for as long as his
participation lasts. Thereafter, as he no longer presents any danger for the
adversary, he may not be attacked." 97 Neither provision can be deemed to be
customary international law.
98
The "unless and for such time" clause has resulted in what has come to be
known as the "revolving door" debate, popularly characterized by the image of
the civilian who is a guerrilla by night and a farmer by day. Can it possibly be
that those who directly participate in hostilities regain their civilian immunity
whenever they successfully return from an operation even though they fully
intend to subsequently recommence hostile action? This scenario is particularly
93 One approach that does not hold water, but surfaces regularly in discussions on the subject, is
basing direct participation determinations on whether military personnel typically perform a
function that has been converted to civilian status. In the first place, soldiers often perform
functions that would not constitute direct participation by civilians: cooking, medical treatment,
providing personal legal advice, playing musical instruments, etc. Moreover, the functions
typically performed by military personnel vary widely from military to military. Therefore, it is
neither possible to convert a military position to a civilian billet and thereby immunize the
function from attack, nor deem everyone filling such a position a direct participant in hostilities.
94 Protocol I, art 51.3 (cited in note 37).
95 Sandoz, Swinarski, and Zimmerman, eds, Protocols Commentay at 1943 (cited in note 64).
96 Id at 1944.
97 Id at 4789.
98 US unwillingness to take such a position is exemplified by Office of the Secretary of Defense,
Memorandum (cited in note 62).
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ill-fitting in the case of civilian employees and private contractors. For instance,
is the requirement simply to return to duties that do not amount to direct
participation? Or does the end of the duty day mark return from hostilities?
More significantly, the revolving door standard flies in the face of logic
grounded in the realities of armed conflict. Military forces facing attacks from
civilians who can acquire sanctuary simply by returning home, a known location
where they may be best targetable, will soon conclude that their survival dictates
ignoring the purported revolving door. And ignoring individual aspects of
humanitarian law invites disrespect for that body of law more generally, thereby
exposing the civilian population to increased danger. Furthermore, a revolving
door heightens the likelihood of direct participation by civilians in that it lessens
the risk to them of such participation.
The sole practical interpretation of direct participation's temporal aspect is
one in which a civilian who participates in hostilities remains a valid military
objective until unambiguously opting out through extended nonparticipation or
an affirmative act of withdrawal. Although the difficulty of ascertaining when the
unlawful combatant has withdrawn from further participation is marked, it is
reasonable that he or she bear the risk that the other side is unaware of the
withdrawal. After all, the unlawful combatant volitionally joined the fray without
enjoying any privilege to do so.
A final issue is whether mere employment by a particular civilian entity or
private contractor can constitute direct participation. Generally, it should not.
Even assuming a firm that is retained solely for duties that would be direct
participation, there would likely be employees therein who engage in other
activities, like cooks or personnel managers. Of course, such individuals run a
high risk of being incidentally injured in legitimate attacks on their colleagues
who have become targetable by virtue of their direct participation.
IV. ILLUSTRATIVE SCENARIOS
As noted, each instance of direct participation must be evaluated on its
own merits. That said, it may be useful to briefly examine major categories of
participation in hostilities, if only to engender further in-depth analysis.
A. ATTACKING MILITARY PERSONNEL AND MILITARY
OBJECTIVES
Any attack by civilians on military personnel or military objectives
constitutes direct participation so long as there is a nexus between the attack and
the armed conflict. The nexus need not be a battle itself. For instance,
combatants may be attacked anywhere they are found outside neutral territory.
As an example, if a civilian attacks a combatant who is on leave at a resort
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because of his or her membership in the armed forces of a party to the conflict,
the civilian has directly participated in hostilities.
On the other hand, if the same civilian attacks the combatant out of
motives unrelated to the conflict (for example, to steal his money), the requisite
nexus is absent. Similarly, civil disturbances would generally not qualify unless
directed at the occupying force, for it is the motivation of the participants that
determines the existence of a nexus. Obviously, though, soldiers have the right
to use even deadly force in self-defense if they or others are threatened with
death or serious bodily injury.
The means used to conduct the attack are relevant only to the extent they
evidence motivation. 9 For example, use of a rocket-propelled grenade against
soldiers in a military vehicle suggests direct participation, whereas using one's
fists to batter a soldier in a bar would not. But perhaps the first incident is a
murder related to a passenger's involvement in organized crime, whereas the
latter is an attempt to kill a soldier as such. It is also usually irrelevant that the
means of injury or destruction are delayed or indirect (for example, remotely
controlled explosive bombs, mines, booby traps, and the like) so long as the
ultimate aim is to directly affect the military capacity of one party to the conflict.
Nor are the nature of the injuries caused generally dispositive. Of course,
an individual who merely slaps a soldier can hardly be deemed to be directly
participating. But when an act causes death or serious injury, or was intended to
but failed, one must still ask why the attack occurred.
Finally, proximity of the act to the combat zone indicates direct
participation, but is in no sense determinative. For instance, a devastating
computer network attack may be launched from continents away. So too may air
and missile attacks. Civilians who are an essential link in the conduct of specific
missions from great distances are no less directly participating than their
counterparts near the battlefront. Distance does not provide civilians sanctuary
from which to directly participate.
The same general approach would apply to attacks on military objectives. It
is the intent of the civilian that matters. Moreover, because military objectives
are defined in part by whether their "total or partial destruction, capture or
neutraliZalion" yields a definite military advantage,"° the hostile act need not be
calculated to permanently damage the object. It is enough that the action
diminishes its military utility. So long as that is the intent, the civilian has directly
99 This position is supported by the Commentary to Article 51.3 of Protocol I: "It seems that the
word 'hostilities' covers ... situations in which [a civilian] undertakes hostile acts without using
a weapon." Sandoz, Swinarski, and Zimmerman, eds, Protocols Commentary at 1943 (cited in
note 64).
100 Protocol I, art 52.2 (emphasis added) (cited in note 37).
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participated. This approach applies equally to dual-use facilities, in other words,
objects with both a military and civilian use. If the civilian's action is intended to
affect the former, it is direct participation; if the latter, it is not.
Reduced to basics, then, the mens rea of the civilian involved is the seminal
factor in assessing whether an attack or other act against military personnel or
military objects is direct participation. In this regard, direct participation would
certainly also require some actus reus; a mere threat would not suffice. On the
other hand, preparation for and deployment to the attack certainly qualify, for it
would be unreasonable to expect the victim of the wrongful attack to sit idly by
while the civilian finalized preparations and commenced the operation. Although
the revolving door issue remains, surely the civilian can be engaged until making
good his escape. 1 ' Again, it would be strange to require victims of a wrongful
attack to break contact with their attackers following a strike.
B. SELF-DEFENSE, DEFENSE OF OTHERS, AND DEFENSE OF
PROPERTY
A civilian government employee or private contractor defending military
personnel or military objectives from enemy attack direcdy participates in
hostilities. His or her actions are indistinguishable from the quintessential duties
of combat personnel. Thus, for instance, civilians may not claim defense of
others when they provide cover or assistance to military forces under attack,
even in cases of ambush. Additionally, performing such functions frees up
soldiers for other combat missions, thereby further contributing to hostile
action. Unfortunately, the absence of agreement on what constitutes a military
objective complicates matters. Nevertheless, the principle that guarding a military
objective against enemy action amounts to direct participation remains.'02
On the other hand, defending any personnel or property against looters or
others (including lawful combatants) engaged in criminal activity or war crimes
does not comprise direct participation. The trickiest scenario is defense of
101 This is the position adopted in the Commentary to Article 51.3: "[IThe word 'hostilities' covers
not only the time that the civilian actually makes use of a weapon, but also, for example, the
time that he is carrying it." Sandoz, Swinarski, and Zimmerman, eds, Protocols Commentary at
1943 (cited in note 64).
102 In the Central Command (CENTCOM) area of operations, contractors are prohibited from
being armed by General Order No 1A. However, subordinate commanders may request an
exception to the policy in order to arm government contractor employees either for personal
protection or contracted security duties. Exceptions are not allowed "where the intent is to
guard U.S. or Coalition MSRs [main supply routes], military personnel, military facilities, or
military property, including property destined for military use." Headquarters, Multi-National
Corps - Iraq, Information Paper. Procedures to Obtain CENTCOM Authoriy to Arm Gornment
Contractor Empqyees (July 29, 2004) (on file with author).
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military objectives against attacks by civilians or other unlawful combatants. In
these cases, the key is whether there is a direct nexus between the threat and the
ongoing hostilities. If so, civilians must avoid becoming involved. Civilians may
also always defend themselves (because they are not legitimate targets under
humanitarian law).'13
In such cases, the civilian is acting either to enforce the law or in
accordance with the right to defend persons and property in domestic and
international criminal law. It would be absurd to hold that the law disallows
defense against illegal actions by the victims thereof or by those who might
come to their aid. After all, recall that law enforcement agencies are not part of
the armed forces, an indication that law enforcement and other activities
designed to maintain civil order during an armed conflict are appropriate. Of
course, any lawful use of force must be necessary and proportionate. In a hostile
combat environment, more force than would seem necessary in a benign
peacetime environment might be justified. For instance, civilians may "shoot
their way out" of a dangerous situation if reasonably necessary to ensure their
safety.
Despite the right to defense against unlawful actions, the presence of
civilians armed for defense in a war zone is highly problematic. The more armed
civilians in an area, the more difficult it is for lawful combatants to distinguish
between unlawful combatants and those who are merely armed for defensive
purposes. This in turn endangers the civilian population by eroding the practical
implementation of the principle of distinction. Soldiers may be more inclined to
employ force against civilians who they feel pose a threat. Alternatively, soldiers
may refrain from the use of force when it is appropriate, thereby assuming
greater risk than necessary.
C. RESCUE OPERATIONS
Operations to rescue military personnel would be direct participation in
hostilities, an inevitable conclusion drawn from the fact that combat search and
rescue ("CSAR") is widely deemed a combat activity.1'0 Similarly, rescuing
103 The Rome Statute provides that there is no criminal responsibility when:
[t]he person acts reasonably to defend himself or herself or another person or,
in the case of war crimes, property which is essential for the survival of the
person or another person or property which is essential for accomplishing a
military mission, against an imminent and unlawful use of force in a manner
proportionate to the degree of danger to the person or the other person or
property protected.
Rome Statute, art 31.1(c) (cited in note 50). See also Prosecutor v Kordic, Case No IT-95-14/2-T,
449-51 (ICTY 2001).
104 UK Ministry of Defense, The Manual of the Law ofArmed Conflict at 12.69 (cited in note 45).
Winter 2005
S chmitt
Chicago Journal of Internalional Law
prisoners of war is combat action that may only be undertaken by military
personnel.
However, the widespread hostage taking in Iraq raises the question of
rescuing military or civilian hostages. A hostage is an individual who has been
unlawfully deprived of his or her liberty and faces threat of death, injury, or
further detention in order to compel a third party to act or abstain to act as a
condition for the release of the hostage. 10 5 Geneva Convention IV, Article 34,
prohibits taking civilians hostage, while Article 147 makes doing so a grave
breach. 106 Protocol I similarly outlaws hostage taking as a grave breach. 07
Common Article 3 to the four Geneva Conventions prohibits seizing individuals
who are "taking no part in the hostilities" during noninternational armed
conflict,0 8 a prohibition echoed in Protocol 11.109 The Statutes of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia," ' the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda,"' and the International Criminal Court"2
characterize hostage taking as a war crime. Although the prohibition is usually
understood as the taking of civilians, it logically extends to military personnel"3
who have been unlawfully deprived of their liberty, for instance through seizure
by civilians who have no right to participate directly in hostilities.
Since virtually every act of hostage taking during an armed conflict is a war
crime and also probably a violation of applicable domestic law, the rescue of
hostages is a law enforcement or defense of others measure, not direct
participation in hostilities. This interpretation corresponds to reality because
most hostage rescue expertise resides in civilian law enforcement agencies.
105 See discussion of the elements of the offense of hostage taking under the ICC Statute. Knut
D6rmann, Elements of War Crimes under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Sources
and Commentay 124-27 (Cambridge 2002). The elements rely heavily on the International
Convention Against the Taking of Hostages (1979), 1316 UNTS 205 (1983).
106 Geneva Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (1949), 6
UST 3516 (1956).
107 Protocol I, arts 75.2(c), 85.2 (cited in note 37).
108 See, for example, Geneva Convention I, art 3(1)(b) (cited in note 44); Geneva Convention II,
art 3(l)(b) (cited in note 44); Geneva Convention III, art 3(1)(b) (cited in note 40).
109 Protocol II, art 4.2(c) (cited in note 49).
110 United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution
808 (1993), UN Doc S/25704 at art 2(h) (1993), 32 ILM 1159, 1171 (1993).
111 Security Council Res No 955, UN Doc S/RES/955 at art 4(c) (1994), 33 ILM 1598 (1994).
112 Rome Statute, art 8.2(a)(viii), (c )(iii) (cited in note 50).
113 See Dinstein, Conduct of Hostilities at 227 (cited in note 45).
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D. HUMAN SHIELDS
The fact that individuals have been compelled to act as human shields does
not render them direct participants in hostilities, even though it is undeniable
that their presence may deter attack on a legitimate target. Rather, they remain
protected civilians, and any likely harm to them must be factored into the
requisite proportionality analysis when determining whether the attack may be
executed." 4 This position tracks Article 51.8 of Protocol I, which further
bolsters their status as nonparticipants by providing that "[a]ny violation of these
prohibitions [in this context, the obligation of states to separate civilians from
military objectives] shall not release the Parties to the conflict from their legal
obligations with respect to the civilian population and civilians [that is,
proportionality]." 115
It is sometimes claimed that voluntary shields also are not direct
participants because "[t]heir actions do not pose a direct risk to opposing
forces" and they are not "directly engaged in hostilities."'" 6 Such an assertion
ignores the fact that the human shields are deliberately attempting to preserve a
valid military objective for use by the enemy. In this sense, they are no different
from point air defenses, which serve to protect the target rather than destroy
inbound aircraft." 7 Voluntary shielding is unquestionably direct participation.
114 The principle of proportionality prohibits attacks that "may be expected to cause incidental loss
of civilian ife, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which
would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated."
Protocol I, art 57.2(a)(iii) (cited in note 37). See also id, arts 51.5(a), 57.2(b).
115 Protocol I, art 51.8 (cited in note 37). It is also the position adopted in US joint doctrine. Joint
Publication 3-60 specifically provides that:
Civilians may not be used as human shields in an attempt to protect, conceal,
or render military objects immune from military operations. Neither may
civilians be forced to leave their homes or shelters to disrupt the movement of
an adversary. Joint force responsibilities during such situations are driven by
the principle of proportionality as mentioned above. When an adversary
employs illegal means to shield legitimate targets, the decision to attack should
be reviewed by higher authority in light of military considerations,
international law, and precedent.
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-60, Joint Doctrine for Targeting A2-A3 (an 17, 2002),
available online at <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/newpubs/jp3-60.pdf> (visited Dec 6,
2004).
116 Human Rights Watch, Briefing Paper, International Humanitarian Law Issues in a Potential War in
Iraq (Feb 20, 2003), available online at <http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/arms/
iraq0202003.htm> (visited Nov 20, 2004).
117 In most cases, it will serve no valid military purpose to directly target the voluntary human
shields. After all, the objective is the target they are shielding. However, the fact that they are
directly participating means that their injury or death would not factor into the required
proportionality calculation. Children who act as voluntary shields would be an exception to this
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E. COMPUTER NETWORK ATTACK AND OTHER FORMS OF
ELECTRONIC WARFARE
Although electronic warfare does not involve kinetic force, it can be just as
devastating to enemy forces as traditional warfare. Military equipment may be
neutralized or destroyed, enemy troops may be injured or killed, command and
control may be disrupted, logistics may be interfered with, intelligence may be
altered or blocked, and so forth. Undeniably, in twenty-first century conflict,
electronic warfare can be as integral to the conduct of hostilities as kinetic
operations. Therefore, it makes little sense to distinguish direct from indirect
participation on this basis. Rather, the key, as with most participation, is to
ascertain the extent to which the electronic warfare in question factors into
ongoing or immediately prospective operations.
It has been suggested that computer network attack is not direct
participation unless it "kills, injures, captures or damages." This assertion
confuses the notion of "attack" with "participation." A computer network attack
that does not result in these consequences is not an attack as that term is
understood in humanitarian law,"' but this fact has little to do with whether or
not an individual is directly participating. On the contrary, many types of military
operations do not involve an attack stictu sensu, but nevertheless are integral to
the conduct of hostilities.119
F. PLANNING
Planning occurs at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. 120 Civilian
government employees are regularly involved in planning at the strategic level,
rule, for as a general matter of law they lack the mental capacity to form the intent necessary to
voluntarily shield military objectives.
118 Michael N. Schmitt, Wired Wa fare: Computer Network Attack and Jus in Bello, 84 Intl Rev Red
Cross 365, 375-78 (2002).
119 For example, collection of tactical intelligence.
120 The US Department of Defense defines these concepts as follows:
Strategic Level of War The level of war at which a nation, often as a member of
a group of nations, determines national or multinational (alliance or coalition)
security objectives and guidance, and develops and uses national resources to
accomplish these objectives. Activities at this level establish national and
multinational military objectives; sequence initiatives; define limits and assess
risks for the use of military and other instruments of national power; develop
global plans or theater war plans to achieve these objectives; and provide
military forces and other capabilities in accordance with strategic plans. See
also operational level of war; tactical level of war.
Operational Level of War The level of war at which campaigns and major
operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to accomplish strategic
objectives within theaters or other operational areas. Activities at this level link
tactics and strategy by establishing operational objectives needed to
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which involves the setting of national security strategy, national military strategy,
and national resource allocation. Indeed, involvement in such planning is a core
tenet of democratic control of the armed forces through balanced civil-military
relations. A typical strategic level planning decision would involve, for instance,
composition of a coalition of the willing.
By contrast, planning at the operational level entails decisions about the
conduct of particular military campaigns or operations, whereas tactical planning
encompasses individual battles or engagements. All tactical level planning, such
as mission planning for aerial operations, amounts to direct participation
because specific military operations could not occur but for that planning. The
same is generally true of operational level planning regarding employment of
forces, although operational level logistics planning is generally remote enough
from the hostilities to avoid characterization as direct participation.
A recurring question involves civilian leaders who engage in military
decision making. If they qualify as combatants (for instance, by serving as the
commander of the armed forces), they are targetable as such. If they do not
qualify, the question is whether or not they are directly participating in hostilities.
The strategic/operational/tactical paradigm of decisionmaking serves as a useful
starting point in this regard. In particular, civilian leaders who engage in tactical
level planning or approval are directly participating and thereby legitimate
targets.1
2 1
G. INTELLIGENCE
As suggested earlier, one distinguisher regarding intelligence operations is
the level of war the intelligence is designed to affect. Gathering, analyzing, and
disseminating tactical intelligence usually amounts to direct participation because
the relationship between the intelligence and the immediate conduct of
accomplish the strategic objectives, sequencing events to achieve the
operational objectives, initiating actions, and applying resources to bring about
and sustain these events. These activities imply a broader dimension of time or
space than do tactics; they ensure the logistic and administrative support of
tactical forces, and provide the means by which tactical successes are exploited
to achieve strategic objectives. See also strategic level of war; tactical level of
war.
Tactical Level of War. The level of war at which battles and engagements are
planned and executed to accomplish military objectives assigned to tactical
units or task forces. Activities at this level focus on the ordered arrangement
and maneuver of combat elements in relation to each other and to the enemy
to achieve combat objectives. See also operational level of war; strategic level
of war.
Department of Defense, DOD Dictionary ofMilitay andAssociated Terms (cited in note 72).
121 See Michael N. Schmitt, State Sponsored Assassination in International and Domestic Law, 17 Yale J
Intl L 609 (1992).
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hostilities is close, whereas strategic intelligence would not be sufficiently related
to the hostilities to render related activities direct participation. Operational level
activities constitute the gray area.
It is essential to emphasize the situational nature of the determination.
Technology now permits the gathering of tactically useful data from great
distances, often by satellite or airborne platform. Few would suggest that
involvement in the launch or control of reconnaissance satellites is direct
participation. However, as that data is processed, analyzed, and disseminated to
troops in the field, the likelihood of civilian involvement being characterized as
direct participation grows.
Lastly, detainee interrogations often result in the development of time-
sensitive tactical and operational level intelligence. To the extent civilian
government employees or private contractors participate in interrogations
designed to elicit such information, as in Iraq, they are directiy participating in
hostilities.
H. LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT
Most logistics and support functions would not constitute direct
participation. For instance, driving supply convoy trucks or feeding and housing
troops are legitimate activities for civilian employees and private contractors.
However, immediate battlefield logistics functions (for example, directly
supplying troops engaged in combat with ammunition) would be direct
participation. After all, resupply during a firefight, or the lack thereof, may well
determine the victor. The battle involving contractors in Najaf cited earlier
forcefully illustrates this point.
I. MAINTENANCE OR OPERATION
The operation of a weapons system by a civilian is unambiguously direct
participation. So too is operation of any nonweapons system, or component
thereof, that is integral to ongoing or imminent hostilities, such as an unarmed
UAV used to locate fleeting targets) 2
Maintenance is increasingly being outsourced to contractors. Depot
maintenance of military equipment, in other words, maintenance conducted
away from the battle zone, is relatively remote from the hostilities and clearly not
122 Lisa L. Turner and Lynn G. Norton, Civilians at the Tip of the Spear, 51 AF L Rev 1, 31 (2001)
(stating that the Judge Advocate General School of the Army adopts the position that "the
contract technical advisor that spends each day working with members of an armed force to
make a weapon system more effective . .. is integrated with [the] force, [and taking an] active
role in hostilities, [and therefore] may be targeted.").
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direct participation. Similarly, routine, regularly scheduled maintenance on
equipment, even near the front, does not directly impact on specific operations.
On the other hand, preparing equipment for battle has a direct impact on
the course of battle. Thus, activities such as fueling aircraft, loading weapons,
conducting preflight checks, performing life-support functions, and locally
repairing minor battle damage would meet the direct participation threshold.
Between these two extremes, as with all other cases cited above, the analysis
must be case specific.
J. PROVIDING TRAINING AND MILITARY ADVICE
In Iraq, much of the generalized military advice (for instance, on
structuring the New Iraqi Army and other military and law enforcement forces)
and most of the training has been outsourced to private firms. Such training and
advice has little immediate impact on military operations. On the other hand, if
civilians are providing advice on the conduct of actual military operations at the
tactical level, then they are directly participating because the flow of hostilities is
greatly determined by their input. At the operational level, the evaluation of such
advice would have to be conducted on a case-by-case basis. To the extent it
involves the deployment of forces into combat for specific operations, it is likely
to amount to direct participation. By contrast, merely offering general advice on
military matters in the area of operations would not. The distinguisher is the
extent of nexus to, and impact on, specific combat operations.
K. RECONSTRUCTION
Many of the government civilians and private contractors in Iraq during
the occupation engaged in reconstruction efforts. Reconstruction of civilian or
dual-use facilities is designed to benefit the civilian population, not to improve
the military wherewithal of a party to the conflict. In fact, in the case of Iraq,
there are multiple UN Security Council Resolutions that encourage
reconstruction efforts.'23 The suggestion that such efforts amount to direct
participation is unconvincing.
Even general construction or reconstruction of military facilities would be
permissible because there is no immediate impact on ongoing military
operations. However, construction that directly relates to immediate combat
operations might well amount to direct participation. For instance, workers who
123 See, for example, Security Council Res No 1483, UN Doc S/RES/1483 (2003); Security
Council Res No 1511, UN Doc S/RES/1511 (2003). See also generally Michael N. Schmitt and
Charles H.B. Garraway, Occupalion Poliy in Iraq and Internalional Law, 9 YB Intl Peacekeeping 27
(2004).
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conduct rapid runway repair following an attack in order to launch aircraft are
directly participating because but for their efforts, no further missions are
possible.
V. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
Participation by civilian government employees and private contractors in
armed conflict is growing exponentially, with no end in sight. Therefore, it is
imperative that agreement be reached on the terms of reference for such
participation. In doing so, it is necessary to balance military good sense, state
practice, and humanitarian concerns. Unfortunately, the increasing tendency of
states to rely on civilians (for reasons that are paradoxically very sensible) creates
a confusing and dangerous environment for military forces engaged in combat.
It also places the civilian population at great risk. Hopefully, time remains to
establish reasonable normative lines of demarcation, ones that protect civilians
and enhance military operations, but which states can accept.
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